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INTRODUCTION
Property rights—for example, direct property rights under the international
intellectual property rights protection system or contractual rights creating assets
in the form of debts, including financial debts in the international financial and
monetary system—can confer on the property holder or creditor powers which
share the characteristics of sovereign powers in some measure. Because property
rights create social relations between people with respect resources—“things”—
and powers over these resources—where the person is exclusively entitled to the
resource, perhaps not in law, but factually and politically—can turn into powers
over people. This conception shares features of sovereignty as understood in the
early modern period. The individual property owner is hardly relevant to this
phenomenon; instead, the important players are the property owners of a bundle
of all forms of property rights, including land, chattels, and intangible assets—
*
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such as financial assets—held world-wide: typically, multinational corporations.
Unlike modern liberal democracies where sovereign powers are ultimately vested
in the people and delegated to representatives in an elected parliament,
corporations, like banks or business entities in the manufacturing or service
sector, lack the checks and balances that developed in states over the last three
centuries. The general meeting of shareholders of a public limited company is in
no way comparable to a parliament. The decision-making body for a private
enterprise, with its limited interests and specialized scope of activity, was not
designed for this role.
One notices that this “corporate” sovereignty shares certain features coming
out of the conceptual development of sovereignty in political philosophy in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, there is a partial return to the
beginnings of this development. While the modern theory of state sovereignty
evolved in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries—especially in
Germany—it has very little to contribute to the analysis of the present problem;
instead, the property-oriented conception of state sovereignty of the seventeenth
century more closely resembles the current phenomena. The authors of the early
modern period carved out and emphasized the distinction between property and
sovereignty, but it was recognized that the conceptual similarity of both was still
sufficiently close. Only some critical authors, from the first third of the
twentieth-century, have remarked that this bifurcation has never really operated in
social reality.
This article shows some of the ways in which certain entities—fundamentally
private law in nature— have recently been empowered by states or the European
Union (EU) to enjoy property and contractual rights to such an extent that they
effectively obtain a certain quasi-sovereign status. The article then examines the
evolution of the concept of sovereignty and its connection with property in
political philosophy and legal theory to obtain a theoretical basis for an analysis
of present developments.
The following discussion presupposes a certain meaning of the terms
“property” and “sovereignty.” For present purposes, it suffices to say that
property rights confer exclusive rights in objects or “things,” whether tangible or
intangible, such as a house, an apple, or an intellectual property. A modern
concept of property would detach the legal construct of “property” from any
possible materiality of a thing: the property right creates the property for the
purpose of the law; the physicality, if any, of an object is only a social reifier that
the property right represents.1 With this concept of dematerialized property one
can explain phenomena of physical chattels, land, incorporeal objects, such as
debts, money and intellectual property rights, even “investment” or goodwill
which all have, at least economically, the status of property. The property rights
are enforceable against the whole world, erga omnes; everyone is bound to
observe these rights.2 This is in contrast to contractual rights that bind only the
parties privy to the contract or other personal rights arising from tort or other
obligations.3 In this article “property” will be understood—consistent with the

1
Andreas Rahmatian, Intellectual Property and the Concept of Dematerialized Property, in 6
MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 361–70 (Sue Bright ed., 2011).
2
See MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 1–3 (4th ed. 2015) (for English law).
3
Id; see also FRANZ BYDLINSKI, SYSTEM UND PRINZIPIEN DES PRIVATRECHTS 171–74 (1996)
(generally and for the German legal family in particular); NADEGE REBOUL-MAUPIN, DROIT DES BIENS
111–12 (3eme ed. 2010) (for French Law).
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terminology of English law4—as comprising tangible, intangible, and pure
intangible property—which includes debts, shares, other securities, and
intellectual property rights. The European Court of Human Rights interprets the
term “property” in Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention of
Human Rights in a similar way.5
Lawyers distinguish between two forms of sovereignty. The first form is the
sovereignty of the state internally, which is the supremacy of governmental
institutions and subject to national public or constitutional law. The second form
is the sovereignty as the supremacy of the state as a legal person founded on the
fact of territory within public international law.6 It will become apparent that this
distinction is less relevant for the present problem than one might expect.
I. EXERCISE OF POWERS RESEMBLING SOVEREIGN POWERS THROUGH PROPERTY
RIGHTS: EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL LAW
A. International Free Trade Agreements (TTIP, CETA)
International trade rests increasingly on free trade agreements, being
international treaties of commercial law. One of these treaties is currently being
negotiated between the United States (U.S.) and the EU, the Transatlantic and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), although the recent election of Donald Trump as
President of the U.S. may put an end to these negotiations. TTIP assumes that
“[t]he obligations of the Agreement shall be binding on all levels of
government.”7 TTIP has been said to be not only about trade, but also about
“generating regulatory coherence and breaking down barriers to transatlantic
commerce” to generate growth and become a “second transatlantic anchor”
alongside NATO.8 TTIP is also meant to be a challenge to the multi-lateral
World Trade Organization (WTO) trade system in which, according to one
commentator, a number of emerging economies do not want to open up to “open
rules-based commerce”—that is, free trade and an unregulated market—and
resort to national protectionist regulatory rules.9 Put differently, national
economies of developing countries should no longer seek to protect their markets
through domestic regulations against cheap—and often subsidized—western
products—usually from the EU—that may destroy their domestic economy and
contribute to the current European refugee crisis.
The same objectives of efficient, high standard regulatory alignment and
modernization apply to the system of Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS)
that TTIP will contain.10 The ISDS are a principal point of grave concern;11
4

BRIDGE, supra note 2, at 13–19; J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23 (1997).
See e.g., CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 345 (4th ed. 2006).
6
MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 487 (6th ed. 2008); see also GEORG JELLINEK,
ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 394, 406, 427, 435 (1900) (Sovereignty is a result of the state powers, being
one of the constituting elements of the state as territory, people and state powers (Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk,
Staatsgewalt)).
7
See Council Directives 11103/13, Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
between the European Union and the United States of America, art. 4, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.
8
Daniel S. Hamilton, Transatlantic Challenges: Ukraine, TTIP and the Struggle to be Strategic, 52 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 25, 32 (2014).
9
Id. at 34.
10
Id.; see also Council Directives, supra note 7, at arts. 16, 23.
5
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similar measures exist in numerous international investment agreements and trade
agreements already in force, but are comparable to TTIP, such as in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).12 The ISDS will be enforced
through arbitration—that is, by private courts with judges selected by the parties
to the arbitration with a procedure not open to the public or public scrutiny.13
Here, a paradox of neo-liberalism becomes apparent: while neo-liberalism, or,
more precisely, market fundamentalism, relies heavily on law—for the
functioning of investment protection, the markets and arbitration as the form of
dispute settlement with awards enforced by state courts—it rejects or circumvents
the state and its legislative and judicial organs—as the sources of law, being
either statutes or court decisions.14 In the present context, the investment
protection of foreign investors which ISDS guarantees in principle is to be seen as
a property protection of foreign companies—“in principle” is a necessary
qualification, because the arbitration scheme permits companies to raise
investment protection claims, but there is no guarantee that the decision of the
arbitral court will sustain such claims. Public policy interests, especially about
health, labor rights, and environmental protection,15 are increasingly taken into
account—or so we are told.16
While the negotiations for the TTIP agreement are currently ongoing—and
have not generally been made public or followed the norm of transparency in
other ways17—one can obtain good insight into the regulation of such a ISDS
system by looking into the sister agreement between Canada and the EU, the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)18—since the
negotiations have been completed. This agreement has been signed and, in all
likelihood, will enter into force. Critics have said that the controversies and
movements seeking to stop TTIP would then become less relevant because U.S.
companies could pursue arbitration through their Canadian subsidiary companies.
According to the consolidated CETA text, the investment—that is, property—
protection is wide, since the market access prohibitions are extensive19 and
“investment” is defined very broadly.20 TTIP is likely to be very similar.21

11
Mark Weaver, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS
Provisions, Reconciliation, and Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 253 (2014–2015);
George Monbiot, The TTIP Trade Deal Will Throw Equality Before the Law in the Corporate Bonfire, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015, 3:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/13/ttip-tradedeal-transatlantic-trade-investment-treaty (instructive summary of the popular reservations against TTIP).
12
See generally North American Free Trade Agreement U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation Treatment rules, and so on.);
Weaver, supra note 11, at 233.
13
NAFTA, supra note 12, at arts. 1115–20.
14
COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 63 (2011); see also Council of the
European Union, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and ECommerce, July 12–17, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf.
15
See Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, INI 2014/2228 at 2(b)(vii)
(2015).
16
Roland Kläger, The Impact of the TTIP of Europe’s Investment Arbitration Architecture, 39
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES UND AMERIKANISCHES RECHT 68, 70 (2014).
17
See Weaver, supra note 11, at 254, 258–59.
18
Hamilton, supra note 8, at 34.
19
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., art. 10.5, Aug. 5, 2014, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.
20
Id. at art. 8.1. “Every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has
the characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain duration and other characteristics such as the
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.” This
is followed by a non-exclusive list. Id.
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Even if arbitration tribunals are more considerate than the critics fear, the
mechanism is necessarily property protection-friendly—whereby “property” is
understood here in the widest possible sense as “assets” or, according to CETA,
“investments” that even include mere chances and opportunities that may later
translate into tangible property.22 Furthermore, while an investment protection
claim is subjected to judicial scrutiny, the court is not a national and public court
of law; nevertheless, it is empowered to make decisions of great importance for
the public and national interest.23 Decisions may even lead to amendments to
existing legislation in the health sector for example, or require changes to
employment legislation—at the behest of a body that is not publicly accountable
as an authority, ultimately before an elected parliament within the constitutional
framework of a modern liberal democracy. Thus, foreign companies can obtain
protection for private property rights through the ISDS investment protection
system that are potentially contrary to the policy decisions and legislative
measures of elected governments. This can amount to an encroachment on a
state’s sovereignty24 and, in effect, a limitation of the freedom of a national
parliament to pass laws. The EU Commission has addressed some of these
concerns when it embarked on a roadmap for further negotiation of TTIP;
whether the concerns have been addressed adequately remains to be seen.25 The
EU public consultation on ISDS produced mostly opposing replies, except from
large corporations.26 The Investment Court system proposed by the EU
Commission in November 2015, as an alternative to the original version of
ISDS,27 changes little because it is not a real system of courts and not subject to
review by the CJEU or other courts.
B. International Property Rights: Intellectual Property
However, one need not speculate about the outcome of ongoing negotiations
of a comprehensive trade agreement with a diffusely contoured property
protection regime. One may rather look at an example of an already existing and
implemented treaty in which straightforward property rights of foreign private
entities obtain world-wide protection: intellectual property rights in the

21
According to a document leaked by Greenpeace in April 2016 on the negotiation regarding the
liberalization of investment, definitions, market access, national treatment, performance requirements, the
EU and the U.S. “have engaged in an in-depth comparison of their respective approaches, with a view to
identifying areas that would require further substantive discussion in future rounds. Work towards a
consolidated text has progressed, notably on definitions, performance requirements and senior management
and board of directors.” Tactical State of Play of the TTIP Negotiations, at para. 1.3 (Mar. 2016)
https://wikileaks.org/ttip/Tactical-State-of-Play/Tactical-State-of-Play.pdf.
22
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 8.1.
23
As to the question of publicity see id. at art. 13.20 (on choice and the list of arbitrators chosen on
the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment, who are willing and able to serve as arbitrators
with “specialised knowledge of international law”) and id at art. 14.10 (“Each Party shall make publicly
available the final report of the panel after it is presented to the disputing Parties, subject to rule 40
(confidentiality).”).
24
In this context, sovereignty is understood as the internal sovereignty of a state with the supremacy
of governmental institutions under national constitutional law.
25
See Kläger, supra note 16, at 71–72.
26
Commission Staff Working Report on Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Agreement (TTIP), at 14 (Jan. 13, 2015).
27
See Press Release, European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and
Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6059_en.htm.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).28
This agreement imports many western standards of intellectual property
protection;29 in fact, TRIPS started as an enforcement treaty to ensure the
enforcement of western intellectual property rights in all parts of the world,
especially in developing countries. Hence, unique to international law treaties,
TRIPS contains rather detailed commercial law provisions on the subsistence and
principles of intellectual property rights to implement a minimum standard of
intellectual property protection de lege ferenda and to enforce existing rights.30
The idea of TRIPS was not only the enforcement of western intellectual property
rights in the rest of the world, but also a development agenda;31 but how genuine
this agenda was cannot be discussed here.32 In the years following the
implementation of TRIPS, it emerged that some non-western countries were no
longer mere recipients of intellectual property rights and know-how, but also
significant producers—especially India, Brazil, and China33—which should have
been a welcome development, whether or not this can be attributed to TRIPS.
The U.S. and the European Union Member States, however, have tended to
counteract this development by resorting to so-called “TRIPS-Plus” bilateral
agreements. These agreements between individual states bypass the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism applicable to TRIPS34 and are generally favorable
to the more economically powerful party to the agreement—that is, the western
party. Even where TRIPS allows compulsory licensing and parallel importation35
of patented products—for example, in the case of a health crisis—that does not
mean the Western countries and their pharmaceutical companies will
automatically acknowledge them. The South African government, invoking this
provision of TRIPS, faced aggressive litigation in 1998 which only came to an
end in 2001—and informally, because of campaigns by NGOs. From this
experience, the right to take protective measures for public health were reasserted

28
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS].
29
See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989); Peter
Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 166–70 (Peter Drahos &
Ruth Mayne eds., 2002); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (NotSo-Brave) New world Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL
STUD. 11, 15–28 (1998).
30
TRIPS, supra note 28, at arts. 8–40 (provisions for a minimum standard for the laws of copyright,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and
unfair competition).
31
Id.
32
For a discussion of the reality, see Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS – Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism,” 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 455–60 (1996); Andreas Rahmatian, NeoColonial Aspects of Global Intellectual Property Protection, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 42–45
(2009); Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property: The Global Spread of a Legal Concept, in 1 KRITIKA:
ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 114, 121 (Peter Drahos et al. eds., 2015) (with further references).
33
Especially in the context of pharmaceuticals. See MONIRUL AZAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 4 (2016).
34
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791,
805 (2001).
35
TRIPS, supra note 28, at arts. 6, 31(b); Carlos M. Correa, Pro-competitive Measures under TRIPS
to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 43, 48–50.
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in the Doha Declaration in 2001,36 and the CETA Free Trade Agreement confirms
the relevance of the Doha Declaration.37
Intellectual property rights give far-reaching powers that go beyond the
proprietary rights in relation to tangible property as a result of their conceptual
and purely intangible nature. Intellectual property rights are not confined to a
geographic location but are abstract legal concepts that can exist worldwide.
Certain international conventions have granted such expansive intellectual
property rights,38 most recently TRIPS. For example, a licensee of a computer
program not only has to accept all restrictions the licensor—the software
company or copyright holder—imposes, but it is also dependent on updates—
perhaps requiring further payment—and compatibility with other software. The
relationship is not a one-off sale but a continuous one, with the sustained power
of the licensor to interfere with the licensee’s activities and business. A seller of
genetically modified crops can gain control over the buyer’s farming methods and
choices on the basis of his patents, in relation to plant varieties, pesticides and so
forth.39 Trademark owners have extensive powers of control over the sale,
pricing, distribution of their products sold under the protected mark—even over
the working conditions in the factories in which the products are produced.40
C. The EU Financial Stability Mechanism
Another intrusion on national sovereignty happened in Europe in the wake of
the banking crisis in 2008 and 2009 and the measures by the European states—
under the auspices of the EU—to rescue the banking industry and, subsequently,
the euro. An analysis of the methods and legal measures for the complex rescue
actions cannot be discussed here.41 From a property theorist’s perspective, one
can summarize these measures as being designed to protect the property of the
banks as creditors so as to avoid their failure and to prevent a systemic failure of
the banking industry in general.
Apart from the emergency measures
implemented to prevent the financial failure in Greece,42 the two particularly
important means of EU financial intervention43 in the present context are the
36
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 44 ILM 746 (2002); Willem Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level
is the Playing Field?, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 183, 188–94; CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, A COMMENTARY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 80–81 (2007).
37
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 20.3.
38
See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514; World
Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698.
39
TRIPS has arguably facilitated this development. See e.g., Martin Khor, Rethinking Intellectual
Property Rights and TRIPS, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 207.
40
See Rahmatian, supra note 32, at 56–70.
41
See e.g., ALICIA HINAREJOS, THE EURO AREA CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 15 (2015).
42
It failed to fulfil all but one criteria to join the Eurozone in the first place. See Sideek M. Seyad, A
Legal Analysis of the European Financial Stability Mechanism, 26(9) J. INT’L. BANKING L. REG. 421, 422
(2011).
43
Other important means include the second revision of the Stability and Growth Pact (“six-pack”),
consisting of five EU Regulations and one EU Directive—Regulations 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011,
1176/2011, Council Regulation 1177/2011, and Council Directive 2011/85; the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance, TSCG (Fiscal Compact), an intergovernmental treaty under international
law between twenty-five EU Member States; and Regulations 472/2013 and 473/2013 (“two-pack”). See
Bruno De Witte, Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional Variation or
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creation of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism44 (EFSF) and, its
successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—as a permanent measure to
enable financial assistance to EU Member States in financial difficulties. The
sources of law from which these measures emerged and the constitutional
significance of the used methods of law-making have puzzled and concerned
many EU constitutional and financial law scholars and specialists.45 In the
European Law Review, Kenneth Armstrong detects that EU fiscal legislation is
trending towards framework norms which blur the boundary between ruleformation and rule-implementation, such that the norm production and norm
compliance operate interdependently and the boundaries become ambiguous.46 In
the words of traditional political theory, this represents a disintegration of the
strict separation of legislative and executive powers—a typical feature of feudal
and landownership-based political and constitutional regimes. This is exactly
what modern national constitutions abolished. 47 Some fiscal measures do not
involve the legislature in form of a parliament—rather weak at EU level in any
case—at all: the Fiscal Compact48 entrusts the European Commission—not the
European Parliament—with new, extensive instruments to direct the fiscal
policies of the Member States49 that have the effect of limiting their national
fiscal sovereignty.50 Ultimately this regulation confirms the prevalence of private
property rights—in the form of investments—in the public law sphere.
In addition to the measures and regulations, the basis of these measures,
however, can also assume forms of private commercial law. The EFSF was
established as a limited liability company under Luxembourg law with its
registered office in Luxembourg. The company shareholders were the EU
Member States in the Eurozone. The EFSF is based on a framework agreement
between the Eurozone Member States and the EFSF—as represented by the
director51—and the construction of the company law confers the necessary legal
personality to enable such an agreement. It is obvious that the legal form of a
company under the private law is not designed to—nor does it permit—a
democratic participation or scrutiny in the way parliaments would under
constitutional laws. In fact, these devices are the result of accommodating certain
obstacles in the EU treaties. Some have assessed this course of action as the
development of a new constitutional order in the EU in the form of an increased
Constitutional Mutation?, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 434, 438–40 (2015); Loreta Poro, Fiscal Union v.
Individual National Sovereignty of EU Members States: A Conceptual Battle, 30(2) J. INT’L. BANKING L.
REG. 68, 73–75 (2015); Kenneth A. Armstrong, The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline, 38 EUR. L.
REV. 601, 601–04, 607–08 (2013).
44
The EFSF is the result of the Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area
countries of 10 May 2010. It was initially envisaged as a temporary measure until 2013, but in fact lasted
until September 2012. See De Witte, supra note 43, at 438.
45
Armstrong, supra note 43, at 605; Seyad, supra note 42, at 425, 428; Jonathan Tomkin,
Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty
on the State of European Democracy, 14 GERMAN L. J. 169, 170 (2013).
46
Armstrong, supra note 43, at 605.
47
This started prominently with the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1–2
48
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union art. 7, Feb.
1, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm [hereinafter TSCG]. This is an
intergovernmental treaty between twenty-five EU Member States and is technically outside EU law.
49
Id. at art. 3 ¶ 2.
50
Poro, supra note 43, at 75; TSCG, supra note 48, at art. 3 ¶ 2 (provision formally preserving the
national parliament’s powers by establishing that a fiscal correction mechanism to be proposed by the
European Commission on the basis of common principles “shall fully respect the prerogatives of national
Parliaments”).
51
Seyad, supra note 42, at 425; Tomkin, supra note 45, at 170–71.
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institutional variation.52 Others believe it is a measure to circumvent and violate
EU constitutional law and to create a transnational executive system that escapes
democratic accountability normally guaranteed by the rule of law.53 At least in
relation to the foundation of the ESM, succeeding EFSF, the latter viewpoint
must appear attractive.
The provisional ESFS was established through a Council Regulation54 on the
basis of Article 122 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).55 This “solidarity clause” for Member States in need has, besides natural
disasters, “exceptional occurrences” in mind, and a sympathetic interpretation
might also include financial crises.56 The permanent stabilization mechanism of
the ESM could obviously not rely on Article 122 (2), because the occurrence
invoked would no longer be exceptional.57 The European Council then decided to
amend the Lisbon Treaty by adding a new provision to paragraph 3 of Article 136
TFEU58 under a simplified revision procedure.59 The reasons for this move were,
among other things, to emphasize that no transfer of power from Member States
to the EU was intended while also avoiding complications in the ratification
process in the Member States,60 especially in form of a possible referendum.61
More importantly, however, this amending procedure was chosen because the
institution of the ESM was in conflict with the “no-bailout” provision of Article
125 TFEU and a formally adequate reconciliation could have proved difficult.62
The European Council decided to have the permanent financial rescue
mechanism of the ESM established by an intergovernmental treaty under general
international law that would be ratified by the EU Member States in the
Eurozone—technically outside of EU law.63 The idea of this financial stability
mechanism was to reduce systemic risks and to establish a restructuring or
insolvency regime, especially for financial institutions with systemic relevance
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and, subsequently, the states.64 The EU could have pressed ahead with further
formal economic-political integration—a politically unrealistic plan—or pursued
an intergovernmental agreement formally less invasive of national sovereignty—
the approach that had been taken for the ESM.65 It is doubtful whether
circumventing the decision-making powers of the European and national
lawmakers while also introducing a regulatory regime that binds the individual
states’ legislatures can really be seen as less invasive of national sovereignty. It is
true, with the route via an intergovernmental treaty, the European Council based
the ESM on a different source of law outside EU law—preventing a formal
conflict with Art. 125 TFEU.66 It, however, is problematic depending on whether
or not the rule of law has been preserved adequately in this way.
A challenge to the compatibility of this legal framework with EU
constitutional law came before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Pringle v.
Ireland and failed.67 The ECJ held that the ESM Treaty was compatible with the
TFEU provisions relating to economic policy—especially with the “no bailout
clause” of Art. 125 TFEU.68 The ECJ said that the ESM Treaty did not oppose
the use of the EU institutions outside the EU legal framework provided that the
institutions do not act in areas that fall under the exclusive competence of the
Union and that the tasks entrusted to institutions do “not alter the essential
character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and TFEU
Treaties.”69
The ESM was presented in the litigation before the ECJ as an independent
entity under international law, in that it was immune from prohibitions under EU
law; at the same time, it was also presented as not an independent entity, in that
the ECJ had jurisdiction to rule on disputes relating to the EU Treaties.70 Also, it
was argued that the ESM was not concerned with monetary policy and was rather
conceived to save the euro.71 One commentator noted that “there were
compelling reasons to create the rescue funds EFSF and ESM outside the EU
legal order, since the Union itself could not act . . . [and] , logically speaking, no
erosion of the EU institutional balance has occurred.”72 Such a statement is,
logically speaking, a petitio principii, and a judgment concerning the
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty from the German Constitutional Court can
demonstrate that.
The German Constitutional Court decided that the EU conforms to
democratic principles.73 In its decision the court held that the Lisbon Treaty did
not create a new state but preserved the European Union as the creation of
sovereign democratic states, even though the EU itself has obtained legal
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personality.74 According to the court, for this level of integration, it was not
required to democratically develop the system of the European institutions in a
way that is analogous to a state.75 Hence, the European Parliament does not
necessarily have the same competencies and powers of a national parliament in a
democratic state.76 The German Constitutional Court also made it clear that the
European Parliament was not a parliament comparable to the national parliaments
of the Member States.77 Under this interpretation, since the EU was still an
organization of independent sovereign states and could not act on its own, the
national parliaments would be left with the authority over the ESM—therefore,
the democratic principle is upheld by the national parliaments. By creating the
ESM, the EU institutions introduced a process for which they did not have the
competencies or powers and thus largely bypassed the national legislatures, which
would have had the respective competencies subject to their national
constitutions.
There are concerns not only about the method of establishing the ESM, but
also about its framework that leads back to an increasingly established prevalence
of international property rights beyond constitutional safeguards by sovereign
states. The ESM Treaty establishes the “international financial institution”
ESM78 modeled upon the private law nature of a company limited by shares79—
with a legal personality,80 shares,81 dividends payable in principle,82 and a
governance regime similar to that of companies.83 But, unlike a normal company,
the governing members have complete immunity from liability for their actions.
In the interest of the ESM, the Chairperson of the Board of Governors,
Governors, alternate Governors, Directors, alternate Directors, as well as the
Managing Director and other staff members shall be immune from legal
proceedings with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity and
shall enjoy inviolability in respect of their official papers and documents.84
The Board of Governors, in connection with the interpretation and
application of this Treaty, decides disputes arising between an ESM Member and
74
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initial capital).
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the ESM or among ESM Members—including any dispute about the
compatibility of the decisions adopted by the ESM with this Treaty.85 Ultimately,
the ESM Member can seek a final appeal against the Governors’ decision to the
CJEU.86 EU countries that have not adopted the euro are not members of the
ESM and have no appeal to the ECJ under the ESM.87 Obviously then, states that
are not a part of the EU are also not members of the ESM either, although they
may be affected by measures of the ESM.
It is understandable that there was not great interest of the EU institutions to
involve the national parliaments of the Member States when drafting the ESM.
Rather, the institutions would take the approach of letting the Member States
effectuate the international treaty according to their respective constitutional
procedures. In this way, the ESM seems to outsource core activities of states’
fiscal sovereignty to a non-state private law entity in substance—and an
institution under international law in form—to broadly safeguard property
interests, particularly of banks of systemic importance. The institutional structure
of the ESM emulates company law that is not naturally equipped to provide the
democratic scrutiny and transparency which public law generally guarantees for
authorities and bodies established under constitutional law. This complete
immunity of the ESM organs for every activity has no counterpart in commercial
law; indeed, company directors are responsible before the national courts. It is
also highly unusual in the context of international law. Diplomats—arguably the
closest equivalent to the members of the ESM governing bodies—do not enjoy
immunity in their sending states. The receiving state can declare them as
personae non gratae, and then no longer recognize the person as a diplomat after
a reasonable period of time.88 An ESM board member can lose its immunity, but
only if another member of the ESM board—that is, the governor or a director—
waives it with respect to that member.89 Apparently neither a national legislature
nor an institution of the EU has the power to intervene in this process, and an
ESM Member State which seeks the waiver of the immunity of an ESM organ
against the ESM boards’ opinion will probably have to appeal to the CJEU90—
possibly even to just establish jurisdiction in the first place.
It appears that decisions by the ESM could bind future national parliaments
in relation to their political decisions on economic policy with a very limited
recourse provided,91 in which case the sovereignty and powers of the legislatures
may become restricted by a non-constitutional act or entity outside the state in
question—and the national parliaments did not and do not have any influence in
the making and the possible amendment of the ESM. Similar problems can arise
for fiscal measures based on the ESM. This question, more precisely the
suspension of voting rights of an ESM Member for non-compliance with the
payment obligations of ESM members under the ESM,92 was raised in a
85
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constitutional challenge before the German Constitutional Court.93 At issue,
among other things, was whether the suspension of the voting rights of Germany
as an ESM Member—for example, because it disagrees with EU fiscal policy
regarding payment duties, especially increase of payment obligations for further
rescue measures, and so on—would restrict and violate the constitutionally
guaranteed budgetary sovereignty of the German parliament. The Court found
that this was not the case.94 The Court said that “an upper limit for payment
obligations and liability commitments following directly from the principle of
democracy could at most be exceeded if the [parliament]’s budget autonomy were
for at least a considerable period of time effectively non-existent.”95 The ESM
Treaty does not oblige Germany, under international law, to agree to a capital
increase.96 The Court probably thought, whether correct or not, that it painted an
extreme scenario that could never occur in a way that an unconstitutional
permanent constraint of democratic principles in fiscal planning can be ruled out.
The Court stated that the ESM Treaty
grants the bodies of the European Union no powers which affect the overall
budgetary responsibility of the German [parliament] and does not force the
Federal Republic of Germany to make a permanent commitment regarding its
economic policy that can no longer be reversed . . . . [The ESM Treaty] does not
grant the European Commission authority to impose specific substantive
requirements for the structuring of the budgets . . . .97
Unfortunately, the constitutional development of the EU is rather
unpredictable.
D. Outsourcing of Traditional Acts of State Sovereignty
The pseudo-commercial law organization of the ESM has already pointed
towards outsourcing traditional acts of state sovereignty. Those activities that
were traditionally understood as the exemplification of the core of state
sovereignty—for example, warfare and related activities—has become
increasingly common. A notorious example in the U.S. was the controversy
surrounding Halliburton. Halliburton, the largest private oil and military services
company in the U.S., obtained the contract to manage the logistical planning of
the Iraq war in 2003 without competitive bidding. The justification of this blatant
creation of a monopoly position was that Halliburton constituted the only
company sufficiently large to manage the task in question. Halliburton, however,
subsequently subcontracted with a number of other companies, creating a web of
contractual relations which obscured specific obligations and accountability or
liability.98 The ensuing scandal of mismanagement and overcharging would
preoccupy the U.S. media and Congress for a long time to come.99 Relatedly,
93
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after the invasion of Iraq, running the country’s economy was delegated to several
large companies to be in charge of reconstruction, transportation, electricity, and
so forth.100
As a consequence of this type of arrangement, the government, as the
representative organ of the executive, is not accountable because it is acting
through private companies. These companies, however, are only liable, in
principle, under contract or commercial law and are free to organize their
company structures and contractual relations—either to achieve favorable tax
status or to obfuscate the chain of command so as to avoid possible civil and
criminal liability. Furthermore, within the construct of corporate mercenaries it
becomes difficult to enforce human rights or international law of armed conflict.
This prosecutorial deficiency is noteworthy because it is possible for contractual
disputes to lead to military consequences. For example, in Iraq, a dispute over
payment for the security for military convoys between two subcontractors led to
an under-equipped and under-prepared team of one of the subcontractors that
subsequently led to the death of four employees—possibly killed by insurgents—
that would trigger the military invasion of Fallujah in April 2004.101
Despite the far-reaching consequences of classical state actions traditionally
derived from state sovereignty, the checks and balances that a government is
subject to under a functioning democracy do not necessarily operate in such
organizational designs with sufficient effect.102 The private property interests of
companies and their shareholders will prevail over those of a state and its
population in a way that the state effectively sanctions private contractual deals
while also ensuring a lack of legal enforceability and allowing—or even
encouraging—favoritism in public procurement.103 The state thus divests itself of
any ability to control these interests or to hold the private actors accountable for
their actions.
E. Summary of the Examples
What these examples have in common is that the agents—usually large and
multinational business corporations and non-state agencies—have powers,
potentially worldwide, through the exercise of their property rights, and these
powers resemble exclusive and absolute powers normally associated with
sovereign states.104 They, however, do not have the formal legal status of a
sovereign subject under public international law, nor do they have the position of
a sovereign under municipal public law. These agents are legal—though
artificial—persons formed under private and commercial law that have
traditionally not been granted sovereign powers.
In the first case, the international free trade agreements, such as CETA and
the currently negotiated TTIP, are good indications that the future development of
non-state sovereignty will be derived from—and invade—traditional state
100

Bart S. Fisher, Investing in Iraq: Legal and Political Aspects, 18 TRANSNAT’L L., 71, 74 (2004).
Jacobson, supra note 101, at 2329–30.
102
Minow, supra note 101, at 1023.
103
In Iraq, even foreign companies that were allies of the U.S., for example, Britain, were excluded.
This was decided just before the invasion in Iraq in 2003. Tiefer, supra note 98, at 36 n.172; see also
Cathy Newman, Oil groups Eye Steak in Wake of Conflict, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003),
http://libertyparkusafd.org/Hancock/primers/Oil%20Groups%20Eye%20Stake%20in%20Wake%20of%20
Conflict.htm.
104
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, The Semi-Sovereign Corporation, in PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 267, 267–69 (James Smith ed., 2013).
101

72

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 7:2

sovereignty. From this, a new relationship between public law and private
property law emerges. The ISDS has the potential to safeguard private
investment interests against public interests without an analogous control that
generally governs a state under a constitutional framework. At the same time,
however, the ISDS must rely on a state’s sovereign powers to enforce the arbitral
awards that implement its property protection over “investments”—broadly
defined and therefore causing inherent conflict with the state’s national
sovereignty in other areas like economic and health policy. The protection is
enforced by international, yet still private, non-state judicial bodies. As noted
earlier, the classical distinction between internal state sovereignty and sovereignty
of a state as a legal person within international law has become blurred and of less
importance.
The second case examines the international protection of intellectual property
rights and the unique characteristics of these property rights. As mentioned
before, intellectual property rights are intangible and geographically
unconnected—in contrast to land—with far-reaching powers and worldwide
enforcement. These unconstrained rights have to the potential to encroach on the
sovereignty of individual states—especially in the developing world. In this way,
it becomes apparent that the non-state entity—for example, a multinational
company—can exercise regionally quasi-sovereign power that restricts or
partially replaces local state sovereignty.
The third example—specific to the European Union—discusses the financial
stability mechanisms for times of financial difficulty. Through the establishment
of the ESM as a principal device aimed towards EU financial stability, the
Member States have created a non-state entity to direct their fiscal activities—
traditionally, a central area of authority for sovereign states. The ESM, however,
effectively falls outside the constitutional checks and balances of the Member
States and the EU—for both its creation and operation.
The ESM’s
organizational structure is modeled upon that of private companies, and the
organs of the ESM are given unprecedented immunity. The investment or
property protection through the ESM is a combination of public and private
interests—especially those interests of states and banks. The property protection
applies to specific branches of business—banks and financial services—and their
respective influences on the financial position of states. Under this “sovereign
debt,” the protection and financial assistance bypasses the legislatures of the
Member States as the central expression of their state sovereignty.
The fourth case concerns the outsourcing of core activities in which state
sovereignty normally manifests itself, such as warfare and associated logistics.
Halliburton is a well-known example of a U.S. company active in such
outsourcing. In this case, quasi-sovereign powers were handed over to a nonstate entity that functioned as a mix of state sovereignty and sovereignty under
international law.
From the viewpoint of constitutional or international law theory, non-state
entities in these four scenarios are not seen as enjoying the classical conception of
sovereign powers; in fact, there does not seem to be a thorough academic
examination of this situation at all. There are some guidelines by the UN about
the conduct of transnational corporations, but there is great uncertainty as to their
legal effect;105 similar guidelines were issued by the Organization for Economic
105
Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 626, 627 (1984);
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Co-operation and Development (OECD).106 But the legal reality cannot be
ignored permanently, and legal doctrine ought to start critically analyzing these
existing phenomena. A study of the evolution of sovereignty as it emerges from
reading the classical texts, as well as the role of property in this development, can
give helpful insights.
II. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Political philosophy, legal theory, and legal history may be a starting point
for trying to explain the phenomena of non-state powers with features of
sovereignty and their relationship to property. The following discussion focuses
more on internal state sovereignty.
A. Bodin
The modern idea of sovereignty, as an expression of uniform state power,
appears in the sixteenth century as an attempt to reconcile the conflicting
authorities among king, church, regional princes, and estates in medieval times.
It was also a reaction to the wars of religion—against which a strong and
undivided state power and pacifying force was supposed to be positioned. The
notion of sovereignty is generally attributed to Jean Bodin: “A commonwealth
(république) may be defined as the rightly ordered government of a number of
families (ménages), and of those things which are their common concern, by a
sovereign power.”107 This sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power
(majestas) vested in a commonwealth.108 The sovereign retains this absolute and
perpetual power, even if he delegates it to an official—this delegated authority
could expire or be revoked according to the sovereign’s will. The power is
absolute if someone has, or obtains, a perpetual power to dispose of property and
persons, to govern the state as he thinks fit, and to order the succession liberally
as any proprietor.109 This power is not a power delegated to him and thus he is
not subject to any commands of another, but he himself can delegate the power.110
The power is perpetual because it lasts for the lifetime of the person who
exercises this power.111 If that sovereign is not a physical human being, but a
magistrate—such as in the estates or a commonwealth of people112—it is
perpetual in the same way that the states are.113 If the sovereign is a prince or
king, then the people have renounced and alienated their sovereign power “in
order to invest him with it and put him in possession,” and thus transfers all their
powers and rights, “just as the man who gives to another possessory and
proprietary rights” over his former property.114 How this sovereignty has been
106
DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THE
GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 75 U.S. DEPT. ST. BULL. 83 (1976), https://babel.hathitrus
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107
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108
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acquired, whether by consent or by force, is irrelevant; the tyrant is sovereign,
like the robber who is possessor: “The robber’s possession by violence is true
and natural possession although contrary to the law, for those who were formerly
in possession have been disseized.”115 The relationship between sovereign—if it
is a prince—and the person subjected to his authority is: one is prince, the other
subject; one is lord, the other servant; one is owner and holding sovereignty, the
other is neither owner nor possessor.116 Law is the command of the sovereign in
the exercise of his sovereign power. The principal characteristic of sovereign
power is that the sovereign can impose laws generally on all subjects regardless
of their consent.117 The sovereign is not bound by other laws, such as the laws of
his predecessors, or by his own laws: the laws proceed from his free will; he is
unable to bind himself, even if he wishes to do so.118
Several points in Bodin’s argument are noteworthy. Sovereignty differs from
property, but property is an illustrative and instructive metaphor to explain the
powers that sovereignty confers. The property owner is a private “sovereign” in
relation to his object of property. The sovereign has imperium, similar to the
owner who has dominium—with the former, the power is exercised over persons
and through these things, while with the latter, power is exercised over things
against persons. Ultimately, this dominium is a power over persons. Sovereignty
does not distinguish between legal entitlement and factual power, because
sovereignty is the source of positive law and legal entitlements. Property law
does distinguish between ownership as legal entitlement—the most extensive
property right—which the robber has not, and factual possession which the robber
also has. The basis for this concept is, of course, Roman private law.119
According to Bodin sovereignty is as alienable as a property right. The property
laws, as indeed all positive laws, are a result of sovereignty.120
B. Hobbes
In the Anglo-Saxon world the author who is associated most with the concept
of sovereignty is Thomas Hobbes. The sovereign in every commonwealth,
whether monarch or “assembly of men,”121 is the absolute representative of all
subjects with unlimited power; the concrete representatives in bodies politic have
limited power prescribed and delineated by the sovereign.122 The sovereign is the
legislator and is above all laws: “For having power to make, and repeal laws, he
may when he pleaseth, free himself from [the] subjection [to the civil laws], by
repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new.”123 The legislator is
not the one who passes laws in the first place, but under whose authority the laws
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continue to remain in force.124 The right of the property owner is to exclude
everyone from his property, except the sovereign; furthermore, the laws of
contract, property transfer, and other dealings with property are determined by the
sovereign.125
Features of the idea of property also appear in Hobbes’s concept of
sovereignty. The owner’s dominium is subjected to the sovereign’s dominium.
This must be so, because a person’s property right derives from the laws and
power of the holder of sovereign power,126 and so it is the sovereign power which
creates the owner’s power that property entails: “But without such sovereign
power, the right of men is not propriety [sic] to any thing, but a community; no
better than to have no right at all. . . . Propriety therefore being derived from the
sovereign power, is not to be pretended against the same.”127 Hobbes explains
taxes as consideration for “that peace and defence [of the property rights] which
the sovereignty maintains for them.”128
C. Locke
Locke qualifies the supreme position of the sovereign with regard to property
in that, for him, the preservation of property is the purpose of government. Hence
“people should have property” which is a prerequisite for people joining
society.129 Even the sovereign cannot take their property without their consent,
otherwise “they have no Property at all.”130 The sovereign only has the power of
passing laws, limited by reason, that regulate property, but there cannot be
arbitrary power. Therefore, taxes can only be levied with the consent of the
people, because otherwise it would undermine their rights of property and the
purpose of government to safeguard property.131
D. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648132 was the first implementation of these
modern concepts of sovereignty in international law and the first modern
European arrangement of secular nation states with unrestricted sovereignty over
given territories, and it is seen as the starting point for modern international
law.133 The Peace of Westphalia does not talk of the concept of private property
as such, since the provisions on restitution,134 acquisition,135 and restitution of
124
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feudal rights, protection of emigrants’ property,136 presuppose the concept of
property,137 but do not define or regulate it. However, Article 8 § 1 on the
constitutional position of the estates in the empire hints at property when it says:
In order to prevent all future disputes over the political order, each and every
elector, prince, and estate of the [Holy] Roman Empire shall, by virtue of this
treaty, be established and confirmed in their possession of all their ancient rights,
prerogatives, liberties, privileges, the free exercise of their territorial rights, both
spiritual and temporal (libero iuris territorialis tam in ecclesiasticis quam
politicis exercitio), their seigneuries, and their regalian rights. In the possession
of all these things, they may not, by virtue of the present transaction, be molested
at any time, in any manner, or under any pretext whatsoever. 138
This legal recognition of the concept of uniform sovereignty of nation
states139 also includes feudal privileges with a property element and outright
private property rights.140 The concept of sovereignty of nation states in
international law, the development of which began in part with the Peace of
Westphalia, is dealt with in specialized works and need not be restated.141
Specialized literature, however, does not concern the relationship of property to
sovereignty.142
III. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN LAW
A. Early Modern Period
Modern international law leaves the phenomenon of property to private
law—and private law passes it on to legal theorists of property143—but, as we
have seen, the sixteenth-century jurists who developed the contemporary concepts
of sovereignty and the modern nation state still took account of property to a
considerable extent. In particular, they emphasized the distinction between
sovereignty—imperium—and property—dominium—which mirrors the Roman
law division of ius publicum144 and ius privatum.145.
136

See id. at art. V §§ 27, 32, 36.
In the respective provisions this could be private, feudal, or public property—or a blend of all three
which was characteristic of late feudal societies.
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Grotius, in his discussion of the original acquisition of property through
occupancy of land, distinguishes carefully between “jurisdiction”—as an effect of
sovereignty—and property— as a result of the occupancy of a specific piece of
land. He says that kings have power over everything in their own dominion, but
every man has his distinct property. Jurisdiction is exercised, first, in relation to
persons, “and that alone is sometimes sufficient, as in an Army of Men, Women,
and Children, that are going in quest of some new Plantations,” and, second, in
relation to a place “called Territory.”146 Yet, although jurisdiction and property
are usually acquired by one and the same act, they are distinct: property may be
transferred. Indeed, it may be transferred not only to nationals, but also to
foreigners, but the jurisdiction in relation to the property remains as it was
before.147 Nevertheless, Grotius says in Mare Liberum that sovereignty is a
special kind of proprietorship because it excludes ownership and possession by
anyone else except the sovereign.148 So the idea of property lingers on, if only as
a metaphor.
Pufendorf follows Grotius’s distinction between sovereignty and property, at
least implicitly, but Grotius is more to the point.149 Pufendorf, however, discusses
a special issue where the different aspects of landholding qua sovereignty or qua
proprietorship come to the fore: in a monarchy, the question is whether or not the
land of the realm is the patrimony—or property—of the king. This can be the
case in certain situations—“when later the ambition of rulers began to list among
their chief possessions sovereignty over men”150—depending on the way in which
the kingdom was acquired. In such cases, kingdoms were included in the kings’
patrimony, “of the alienation of which at their pleasure rulers had received the
power to dispose, because this was understood to be a part of the highest force of
dominion”151 or, one may query, sovereignty. If the case of a patrimonial
kingdom is answered in the affirmative, the effect of
this manner of holding sovereignty is seen clearest in the fact, that not only is
the condition of subjects fixed at the will of kings [as sovereignty in the form of
passing laws and jurisdiction], but also that a king can transfer his right over such
a kingdom to whomsoever he pleases.152
Pufendorf’s explanation indicates a certain critical distance to the solution,
which is presented as something coming from the past. But while the natural
lawyers of the seventeenth century may have found it increasingly difficult to
reconcile natural law principles with the idea that a kingdom could be the
personal property of a king, we should not forget that in the colonial era of the
nineteenth century, the Belgian Congo—the Congo Free State—was effectively
the personal property of the Belgian king—legally it was more complicated.153
146
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Rousseau distinguishes between sovereignty and property,154 and he stresses
that property can be alienated, while sovereignty—contrary to Bodin—cannot
be.155 Montesquieu spells out the distinction more clearly: the “political laws” by
which men relinquished their natural independence give them liberty, while the
“civil laws” by which men renounce the natural communality of goods, confer on
them property.156 The classical bifurcation of public law, sovereignty, and private
law, property, is also emphasized.
The emphasis on a conceptual separation of property and sovereignty, from
the late sixteenth century onwards, is an attempt at overcoming feudalism—where
the public and private law aspects, especially in relation to feudal duties and
landholding, are strongly intertwined. This feudalism was also a basis for the
mediatization of state powers via the feudal lords and the subordination of the
king under the church, and the modern concept of sovereignty sought to eliminate
both.157 The definition of “property,” in the sense of private law, also hails
significantly from the seventeenth century natural law jurists, which always
included reference to classical Roman law or its developed forms in the ius
commune. For Grotius, violation of property was a justification of war. This
angle allows him to launch into a discussion of the private law concept of
property in a public law and international law context. He offers the common
narrative—which has become particularly well-known because of Locke158—that
God has given man things over which man has property in common, but when
“labor and industry” emerged, communal property was no longer sustainable,159
and men obtained property by appropriation—either expressly by agreement in
the case of division, or tacitly in the case of seizure. To Grotius, this was the
beginning of private property.160 Grotius then proceeds to examine the rights
arising from property—especially ownership.161
Grotius further deals with the original acquisition of rights, not over things,
but over people, such as the rights of parents over their children—which arise
from “generation”—or the rights arising from marriage or other associations, such
as people and an assembly or person governing them or an association of several
states. Grotius considers these rights over persons as arise from consent which
itself is derived from the respective association or subjection.162 A parallel
discussion can be found in Hobbes, with the specific rule for the family, “wherein
the father or master of the family is sovereign of the same; and the rest (both
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children and servants equally) subjects.”163 In Mare Liberum Grotius explains
that no one is sovereign over a thing which he has never possessed—or which no
one has ever held in his name—and, like in private law, only the delivery of
property and subsequent possession confers sovereignty.164
Pufendorf was important in the shaping of concepts of property, at least on
the European continent, and he was influenced by Grotius and Blackstone’s
discussion of property.165 Equally important was Pufendorf’s classical liberal
statement that individual and private property, not communal property, safeguard
peace in a society.166
B. Twentieth Century
Real advances in the theory of the state and sovereignty in legal scholarship
in the twentieth century came from the German-speaking countries. Although the
German legal scholarship on the theory of the state and the law in the first third of
the twentieth century was substantial and influential, it also lacked any significant
treatment of the relationship between sovereignty and property. The emphasis on
conceptual separation—but at the same time proximity—in the discussion of
property and sovereignty was characteristic only of the texts of the seventeenth
century. The leading legal scholars of the twentieth century in this area were
Hans Kelsen, Hermann Heller, and Carl Schmitt. These three very different
scholars are, however, connected by a certain neo-Kantian perspective as a
starting point.167
Kelsen stresses that the state has a normative character, more precisely, it
constitutes a normative legal order—state and legal order are identical.168 Only
within this normative order is sovereignty conceivable. Property is merely a set
of norms emanating from the power of legislation that is innate to a state and its
sovereignty.169 The state is a legal person,170 and, as a legal person, it holds
property in form of the fisc.171
Heller criticizes Kelsen’s strict separation between an idealist realm of
“ought” and the reality of the “is,” which leads to the congruence of legal order
and state but is artificial in the light of real states. “Ought” and “is” are bridged
by the legal ought as being understood as a human will. The act of will that passes
law is a dialectic unity of will and ought.172 While Heller introduces a more
sociological approach against the strict positivist position, as exemplified by
Kelsen, he does not deal with the proprietary aspects of state sovereignty, either.
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Nor does Carl Schmitt, who has recently gained some importance in AngloAmerican academic discourse, irrespective of the limited value of his theories.173
Schmitt, representative of a certain strongly conservative position and a
sinister figure in legal history, was the leading jurist for the Third Reich and the
most prominent apologist for its violations of the constitution until he became
isolated beginning in 1937, apparently because even the Nazis found his
unashamed opportunism too uncanny.174 Schmitt criticizes Kelsen for his abstract
conception of state-law-sovereignty.
A valid norm as such cannot be
“sovereign,” while a constitution can be, in that the state is treated as something
genuinely imperative that corresponds to norms. Sovereignty has existential
superiority over the norm, hence a lawmaker can only establish, never violate
norms.175 The fiction of legal positivism that conclusively embodies sovereignty
in constitutional norms disregards the essential political decisions of the state in
reality, and these can conflict with norms. These “statutory ruptures” are
characteristic even of the modern Rechtsstaat.176
It is the exception—
characterized by unlimited authority—being the emergency state, not the normal
legal system, which determines who is sovereign, and the sovereign decides
whether there is an emergency state and whether the constitution has to be
suspended.177 This concept of the supremacy of political leadership over norms
of a Rechtsstaat in a liberal understanding and the connection of sovereignty with
the political—not the law—became a suitable vehicle for the justification of any
kind of arbitrary political act after 1933.178 It cannot be expected that the liberaltechnical concept of property would play any role in these diffuse and strange
romantic concepts.
Neither the twentieth century liberal-democratic tradition—represented by
Kelsen in its strictly positivist form and by Heller in a more sociologically
informed version—nor the conservative tradition—very broadly understood, in
the case of Schmitt—provides an explanation for the effect of property on
sovereignty and the relationship between these two. Property rights are just a
subset of the legal system. The legal system, in turn, is superordinate to
sovereignty in Kelsen’s view and even absorbs sovereignty—and the state
itself—or it is subordinate to sovereignty according to Schmitt. This view is
reinforced by the way public lawyers understand law given that legal theorists
are, for the most part, public lawyers. But this approach has become more and
more outdated.
173
Id. at 207 (discussing one of the essential features of Schmitt’s thinking in an apposite critique,
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IV. FEUDAL EFFECTS OF PROPERTY
A. A Wider Sociological Understanding of Feudalism
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Hobhouse, Tawney, and Morris
Cohen provided a different analysis of the prevalent liberal interpretation of the
concept of property. Hobhouse distinguished between property for use—as a
power over things—and property for power—as a power relationship either
between or over those people who have a duty of noninterference.179 Tawney
elaborated on this definition by stressing the conceptual separation between
ownership and work.180 Work would normally confer active ownership, and the
corresponding property, such as food, stock-in-trade, tools, would therefore be a
certain function or performance of a service.181 The large majority of property,
however, is in passive ownership, which is not a means of work but an instrument
for the acquisition of gain or exercise of power—divorced from responsibility.182
This passive property for acquisition and exploitation of power—as opposed to
active property—appears in the form of rights, such as royalties, ground-rents and
especially company shares—and today one would add, financial instruments of
all kinds, like derivatives—as a basis for a class of rentiers.183 Both active and
passive property are, at least for the lawyer, property in equal measure, but
passive property is so divorced from actual physical objects for use that they are
closer to a form of currency.184 Different from property as a result of one’s labor,
property for exploitation and power confers income upon its owners that is not
derived from personal service.185 As a result, “property is not theft, but a good
deal of theft becomes property.”186
Morris Cohen directly addressed the problem that is discussed here: property
and sovereignty are, from a sociological and political perspective, by no means
strictly separated. The legal distinction between dominium—rule over things by
the individual—and imperium—rule over all individuals by the prince and an
expression of sovereignty—will undoubtedly become blurred if one considers that
the essence of a private property right is the right to exclude, not only the right to
use by the owner—ius utendi, fruendi, abutendi. This right to exclude entails the
obligation of others to obtain the owner’s consent for the use of the property, and
this power to consent gives a limited power and control over the other person
seeking consent. Thus, for example, a landowner may obtain power over those
who want to live on the land by obliging them to render services to him as a
prerequisite for his consent, whether historically in a feudal setting or, as today,
based on private law of contract and property.187 Similarly, the employer will
have power over his employees to require a certain behavior as a condition for
employment or continuation of employment. The employment relationship is
theoretically based on a contract that was freely entered into, but typically the
179
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strong economic position of the employer tilts the bargaining power substantially
in its favor. Because the exercise of a property right confers power over people—
compelling them to behave in a certain way—Cohen maintains that property has
the character of a sovereign power, so property is a form of sovereignty.188
Cohen only mentions in passing the role of bankers and financiers and does not
discuss the corporate powers of companies and their shareholders because of the
passive property for acquisition and exploitation.189
These more sociological interpretations of the powers of property highlight a
phenomenon that is well-known from the era of feudalism, and Cohen himself
points out that the feudal system did not separate dominium from imperium; its
characteristic was the inseparable connection between land tenure and personal
homage.190
B. The Classical Historical Legal Concept of Feudalism
While an outline of the feudal system that emphasizes its legal institutional
elements may be an idealizing presentation of this system from the viewpoint of a
social historian,191 it nevertheless serves well for the analysis of the concepts
attempted here.192 The medieval idea of the state until about 1300 was that of a
realm, eternal and unlimited in space: a universal Christian imperium. What
constituted the state was initially a relationship between persons, but that
developed into socio-political formations that increasingly contained a territorial
element. The rivalries between the secular rulers and the church in the investiture
conquest in the eleventh and twelfth centuries paved the way for the modern
nation state, because the state had to define itself against and resist the central
ecclesiastical power or the potestas papae.193 Besides, the strongly personal
element in the feudal bond became gradually eclipsed by the proprietary element,
so the territorialization of the state was accompanied by a stronger propertization
of the individual feudal relationship—although one was not connected to the
other as such. In fact, feudalism was an important force in the fragmentation of
the state and in its division into smaller principalities as territorial states,
particularly in Germany.194 The practical applications of the theories of
sovereignty in the later Renaissance period, as discussed above, led to these
smaller territories and legally independent principalities. Initially, feudal
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relationships could be used as an argument to prove sovereignty in respect of a
specific territory—even up to the present day, in rare cases.195
The legal elements of the feudal relationship were somewhat simplified196:
the personal element—the contract of commendation or vassalage that consisted
of the act of homage that established the placing of the vassal’s person at the
lord’s position—and the oath of fealty—with which the vassal undertook to be
faithful to the lord. In particular, the oath of fealty was seen as the source of the
mutual obligations of lord and vassal—for example, the vassal’s military services,
advice,197 and the lord’s duty to protect and to provide for the vassal.198 The
property element—which only became especially dominant during the classical
period of feudalism and onwards—was the fief or benefice: a grant of land to the
vassal to secure the vassal’s maintenance, having been the lord’s duty, and to
enable the vassal to carry out the vassal’s services due to the lord.199 When the
fief or proprietary element later came to the fore within the feudal bond, fiefs
emerged which were not attached to services to the lord,200 or services for which
the vassal was not granted land but obtained money with which the lord fulfilled
his obligation to the vassal.201 This gave the feudal system a capitalist aspect.202
In particular, the last two phenomena are important for an analysis of sociological
effects of a personal dependence—“feudalism” in a wider sociological sense203—
because of a proprietary nexus and the permeation of state sovereignty with
proprietary elements.
V. COMBINING THE ELEMENTS: POWERS IMITATING SOVEREIGNTY WITH
PROPERTY
Property rights, and the contractual relations of private law—especially in the
context of international commercial law—for preparing the attribution and
transfer of property rights, are intermingled with state sovereignty and serve as a
constitutive force in establishing sovereignty; both internally—within the state
where it establishes as the supremacy of governmental institutions—and
externally—in the realm of public international law where it serves as the
supremacy of the state as a legal person founded on territory.204 International law
is more open to a private law-based approach than municipal public law, since
195
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typical institutions of international law emulate private law—for example, the
contract law nature of treaties205 or the property law nature of state territory and
its acquisition206—with its characteristic subjects of equal standing, the sovereign
states, as opposed to the classical public law setting of hierarchy and
subordination. The Austrian economist F. A. Hayek, who trained as a lawyer like
many other Austrian economists, noticed the attitude in public law as compared to
private law:
The belief in the pre-eminence of public law is a result of the fact that it has
indeed been deliberately created for particular purposes by acts of will, while
private law is the result of an evolutionary process and has never been invented or
designed as a whole by anybody.207
Public law passes, private law persists.208 It is therefore difficult for public
lawyers and legal theorists to understand that matters traditionally reserved to
projectable and alterable public law can be regulated with the means of generally
persistent private law which does not have built-in checks and balances for public
accountability and revision—such as separation of powers, parliamentary
scrutiny, and constitutional courts.
Legal theory has not realized that a new form of sovereignty is being created
by a mixture of cooperation between states and corporations and outsourcing of
activities commonly regarded as expressions of state sovereignty—for example,
private prison services. Nor have scholars realized that this new sovereignty is
the result of detailed international agreements of a clearly private and commercial
law nature, which organize matters of financial and fiscal sovereignty—for
example, the ESM—or which guarantee worldwide property protection that may
affect the way of peoples’ lives in certain regions—for example the TRIPS
Agreement on intellectual property rights. All that is underpinned, not by a
traditional state bureaucracy, but by an ubiquitous managerialism: it derives from
management science developed for private enterprises and is applied throughout,
not only in business corporations, but increasingly also in state institutions.209
This is reminiscent of the critique of the Frankfurt School. But Karl Jaspers
already had described the dehumanizing and leveling reduction of the individual
human being as elements in an “apparatus” for maintenance in society in which
the individuals fulfill short-term oriented duties without a permanent aim or
perspective—derived from the structure of an anonymous and scientifically
optimized management organization that is found in enterprises and state
institutions alike.210 For Jaspers, this apparatus confers the fiction of equality, but
self-evaluation only exists through envious comparison with others. Any effect
of intellectual endeavor can only be achieved by advertisement. Otherwise one
cannot reach this unintellectual mass of people that represents “being” without
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“existence” and adopts superstition, not creed.211 Carl Schmitt observed that there
is an “onslaught against the political”—the “political” being “the exacting moral
decision”—and the “biased rule of politics” appears to become replaced by
“unbiased economic management.”212 Political problems are supposed to be
dissolved into organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks; the
modern state becomes a “huge industrial plant.”213
Modern legal theory does not assist in an analysis of the modern relationship
between property and sovereignty. One must return to legal history, the feudal
system, and classical political philosophy. It seems that sovereignty has not
disappeared, but adopts the early forms of the seventeenth century from which it
emerged. Bodin and Hobbes saw the property right or dominium emanating from
the sovereign’s imperium, and that is the endpoint already for modern twentieth
century constitutional theory about sovereignty: property need not feature
specifically—and indeed it does not—with thinkers such as Kelsen, Heller or
Schmitt. But the exclusivity of the rights of the owner—the classical ius utendi,
fruendi, abutendi—have the quality of imperium in the realm of private law.
Furthermore, the sovereign power can be delegated, for example to an authority
or an official, and according to some—Bodin, not Rousseau—sovereignty can be
alienated, like property. Historically, the idea of sovereignty was modeled, to a
large degree, on the familiar concept of property. This could not be otherwise,
because the feudal system Bodin and other Renaissance thinkers sought to
overcome was the contemporary system they knew—although the prime of
feudalism had long passed. What remained was the proprietary aspect of
feudalism, the beneficium, while the personal bond of vassalage had largely
become an empty formality. It was the time of early “capitalist” forms of fiefs
which were not attached to personal services and fiefs de bourse. Offices within
the state were attached to fiefs and were obtained through purchase.214 While the
early modern thinkers emphasized the separation between sovereignty and
property to move the emerging modern nation state away from feudalism,
property was nevertheless a source for the concept of the all-embracing and
unfettered power that characterizes sovereignty. Grotius clearly saw sovereignty
as a special kind of proprietorship, not technically, but as to its effects, which
emulate ownership. Pufendorf shows that it could become difficult to disentangle
the ownership of the sovereign—at the time typically the king—of his personal
property from his possible ownership of the state territory, a problem that
recurred with colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.215
As the sovereign nation states weaken, property returns as the amalgamating
force that can transcend national borders in a globalized market. “Property” is to
be understood in the wide sense of “assets”, and it is the equivalent to the
definitions of “investments” which are provided protection through mechanisms
211
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in free trade agreements, such as CETA. Thus “property” includes not only
physical objects, but also contracts, that is: debts—including money,216 company
shares, monetary and financial investment products of any kind—as well as
options and expectations and products in relation to the assumption of risk.
“Property” in the present context also comprises property organized for holding,
investment, and exploitation—for example, in the form of a company or other
business organization. Corporate law emphasizes the separate legal personality of
the company as property owner—so that shareholders technically do not own the
company—but the aspect and effects of sovereignty of the property-owning
company do not go away.217 An agreement of a free trade treaty—such as
NAFTA and the future CETA and TTIP, if implemented—is an expression of
sovereignty of the negotiating states. Once implemented, it is not merely a
delegation of sovereignty to an international body or a network of contractual
relations based on an international treaty—that is, contractual in nature—and
securing property claims—through investment—but a partial alienation of
sovereignty.
Property-created quasi-sovereign powers, however, remain
dependent on the state, since property and contractual rights only exist because
individual state powers enforce these rights—in courts, in enforcement
procedures—as an application of the general sovereign powers that characterize
states. The private law of contract and property—property understood in a wide
sense—is enforced and rendered effective by the sovereign powers of the states
which acceded to the treaty: the duties under the treaty cannot be annulled
because the contract under private law keeps binding the states and their
legislatures, and these can only act in conformity with the international treaty.
One can agree with Hayek:
public law passes, private law persists.
Theoretically, a contracting state can declare to be no longer bound by such a
treaty or it may affect a material breach of the agreement and thus terminate, or
have terminated, its membership under international law.218 Whether that is a
realistic option from a political, economic, or military points of view, is a
different matter.
The implementation of ISDS through arbitration is a
privatization of parts of the judiciary which is traditionally another central part of
a state’s sovereignty. Here we even have parallels to historical feudalism,
because in the feudal era the courts were in the jurisdiction of the feudal barons
and the state’s—that is, the king’s—power was mediated through these local or
personal courts. Today there are no feudal barons, of course, they are replaced by
a conglomerate of international companies and states—acting as private entities
and not in the capacity as sovereign powers—and, as a very important difference
to historical feudalism, disconnected from any specific territory or land.
Where the content of the treaty is not a web of contractual relations which
create, or protect proprietary interests, but outright property rights themselves,
particularly those not attached to any physicality or geographic location and
territoriality. For example, with intellectual property rights—safeguarded by the
TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions—one can make out the
consequences of international property protection even more directly. Both free
trade agreements and intellectual property enforcement can have a profound
influence on the political and economic situations of people and peoples.
Decision-making does not necessarily require the participation of the national
216
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legislatures of individual states in a way that could shape the political and
economic future of the nation significantly—even if the people have voting rights
in a general election to a parliament in a liberal democracy. This is the
sociologically-informed definition of the power of property with the
characteristics of a sovereign power that Tawney and Morris Cohen described in
the 1920s—although they spoke little about the corporate powers and the
financial systems then.
The corporate powers of companies, banks, and financial systems in general
came to the center of attention with the bailout of the banks following the
financial crisis in 2008.219 The financial stability mechanism that the EU
developed as a consequence of the rescue actions for the banking industry is
firmly based on a private law-commercial law framework. The ESM and its
predecessor, the EFSF, have been organized in the form of companies. The EFSF
organized as a national limited liability company under Luxembourg law. The
ESM is organized as a creature of a treaty of international law that emulates
commercial companies, with independent legal personality, shares upon which
dividends can be declared and a corporate governance system that resembles the
two-tier system of governance of companies limited by shares in Germany. The
treaty establishing the ESM is an intergovernmental treaty, and although the EU
acted as an agency for the negotiations bringing about this agreement, the treaty
and the ESM are outside EU constitutional law. Although the contracting parties
are the EU Member States within the Eurozone, they are not parties by virtue of
their status as EU Member States, but just as ordinary states under international
law. The EU Member States have effectively reduced—perpetually and
irrevocably—the exercise of their sovereign powers by largely precluding any
participation of their national parliaments in the making and amendment of the
ESM or measures under it. The EU itself has clearly ceded its supranational
sovereignty—leaving aside whether that concept exists220—permanently in
creating the ESM, and the grant of an extensive immunity to the organs of the
ESM, which mirrors sovereign powers, further emphasizes that fact. The fiscal
powers that the ESM can wield on the basis of private-commercial organizational
structures created under international law are profound,221 and unlike the EFSF,
the ESM is theoretically perpetual.
If the EU embarks on making it a more common practice to establish such
international agencies, it could make itself redundant in the long run. A possible
disintegration of the EU may not necessarily be provoked by the refugee crisis,
for example, but by the strengthening of the banks and the financial sector
instead—by conferring quasi-sovereign powers through private law techniques.
Then, the businesses of the financial sector no longer need the EU for their
operations since the members states will become separate international entities—
either in the form of companies for the operational side or intergovernmental
organizations for the regulatory side—with an arbitration system of civil
procedure for dispute settlement and without interference from either the
parliaments or courts of law of the nation states or the EU. This is evidently the
219
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creation of a conglomerate of sovereign bodies—ultimately based on contract and
property law—that gradually replaces the sovereignty of nation states that, in
their exercise of their own sovereign powers, helped initially to form these new
sovereign bodies. It is also a replacement of public, constitutional law by private,
international commercial law. Again, there is a certain reminiscence of
feudalism. A major difference is, however, that today the state cedes sovereignty
through permanent delegation, so that business entities and international
regulatory bodies and financial agencies—such as the IMF—obtain quasisovereign power, like the historical estates and the church—in contrast to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the state took such powers from the
estates and the church.
Furthermore, today, this transferred sovereign power is shared with the
powers of the state. Whether the state has ultimate control and a right to retract,
as true delegation of sovereignty would require, however, is doubtful. Lawmaking is still in the sole sovereign power of the state—although there is a
proliferation of rules and regulations in the financial sector which do not derive
from classical legislatures—so it still remains necessary for businesses to
influence legislation through lobbying.
This permanent transfer of sovereign powers, in part, is not confined to fiscal
powers. Core acts of sovereignty, such as warfare and its logistics, have been
outsourced to private companies. The case of Halliburton and its subcontractors
in the U.S. in the Iraq war is but one prominent example. Such evolutions
commercialize the state in all its facets and ultimately promote the state’s
redundancy.
The intention of such methods of implementation is obviously to bypass
pesky parliaments—and the voting public—and courts of law, which may block
certain acts as violating constitutional rights and the rule of law. The further
effect is that parliamentary elections and any involvement of the general public in
politics, legal reform, and constitutional development of a state can become less
and less relevant.222 One could already notice these effects in the context of
financial stability measures and sovereign debt. The problem with imposing
certain financial and economic austerity programs is that they are supposed to be
accepted by future incoming governments, irrespective of their political
orientation and of the economic theories they may wish to implement. This was
clearly demonstrated by the election in Greece in January 2015 and the
referendum in July 2015.223 The insistence on the austerity measures by the EU—
led by Germany—against the professed conviction of the Greek ruling parties did
little to advance the democratic reputation of the EU and its Member States.224
The practical inability to depart from a given economic plan forces political
parties of different political convictions to agree on broadly the same economic
policy. That, in turn, destroys political pluralism that is the essence of a liberal
democracy.
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Furthermore, it makes democratic elections increasingly redundant since one
of the central elements of a national government is the ability to shape economic
policy. One can see an erosion of state sovereignty by economic “practical
constraints” of the “laws of the market” and inherent necessities which are not
subject to democratic scrutiny because a parliament—no matter how it may be
composed after new elections—has to consider itself bound by these constraints.
Where the envisaged economic measures are, in the exceptional case, put to a
vote in a referendum, an undesired result can be disregarded or counteracted with
political pressure on the government. This happened in Greece where a
referendum was planned for 2011-2012—the government under Papandreou—
and then abandoned under pressure.225 In July 2015—the government under
Tsipras—a referendum was actually held that rejected the bailout plan. Despite
that, a bailout plan that even went beyond the bailout conditions put to vote in the
referendum was implemented.226 The partial delegation of state sovereignty in
the form of contract and property structures and commercial business
organizations confers upon banks and businesses sufficient power to assert their
interests—and economic theories advancing their interests—against parliaments
and politics with noticeable success.
The future could be a bleak one. Large multinational corporations—
generally unconnected with a specific state or territory—may organize whole
societies and communities through contractual agreements with other business
entities—including states which are acting in ways that resemble businesses and
not sovereign bodies. Property rights are created, transferred and safeguarded.
The exploitation of these rights, in effect, consists of activities that traditionally
fell within the domain of politics and the exercise of sovereign state powers.
Disputes among these corporate entities are settled by way of private courts
through arbitration; the role of nation states being limited to ensuring the
enforcement of arbitral awards at the local level. Defense measures against
attacks, real or claimed, on a company’s commercial interests can be approved
informally by a government and subcontracted to a mercenary company
specialized in warfare. These days, cost-effective drone attacks against
oppositional individuals and groups or parties in breach of contractual duties
could be implemented everywhere in the world. The parliaments are confined to
legislation giving effect to the framework of international commercial contractual
and property relations, for example, through suitable enforcement or employment
laws. This is backed by a management system which is supposedly well-suited
for businesses and state authorities alike—politicians, senior company managers,
civil servants, journalists, academics all become interchangeable managers.227
Allegiances and dependencies are created through contractual and employment
relationships, not too dissimilar to feudal times.228 But the symbol of allegiance is
no longer the coat of arms of the lord or the flag of the state; instead, it is the
trademark of one’s company. Any important political discourse, vision, or
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measure, is reduced to a business decision or a business plan. The principal way
of participating in such a business decision is in the shareholder’s meeting of a
company—which presupposes ownership of voting shares and preferably a
majority of shares at that. This would be in a strange way the resurrection of the
specter of the Prussian “three class” voting system,229 which disappeared in
1918.230 This system would fit nicely within the trend towards privatization of
the state—especially if the criterion of eligibility to vote were no longer taxes, but
company shares. Such a reform would presumably also invoke John Locke’s
comments on taxation and representation as a justificatory authority.
The future, however, need not develop in this way. The start for reform is
not initially legislative change, but the abandonment of the ubiquitous paradigm
that law can be replaced by economics and management; that justice can be
considered as a version of efficiency. That would confine businesses to their
proper role again as producers and providers of goods and services while
encouraging the states to exercise their traditional sovereign powers—subject to
the modern liberal democratic constraints of a system of checks and balances.
Only when this guiding principle has been reestablished will legislative reform
can be meaningful and effective.
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